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INTERNING DISSENT: THE LAW OF 
LARGE POLITICAL EVENTS 
AARON JOHNSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s recurrent indications that content-
based distinctions pose the greatest danger to liberty of expression,1 
the central problems facing free speech today are primarily content-
neutral. Several developments support this conclusion. For one, the 
Supreme Court has made clear over the past two decades that almost 
any content-based restriction on expression will fail, unless it involves 
some long-recognized category of unprotected speech.2 The Court has 
struck down content-based restrictions targeting even some of the 
ugliest and most disturbing types of expression imaginable—cross 
burning,3 depictions of animal cruelty,4 and protests outside the 
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 1.  See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (“[R]estrictions based on 
viewpoint . . . are particularly pernicious.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its 
purest form . . . .”). 
 2.  Similarly, the Court has strongly suggested that it is not likely to recognize any new 
categories of unprotected speech. For example, in United States v. Stevens, the Court addressed 
a challenge to a statute aimed at “crush videos,” a particularly nasty type of pornography. See 
559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010). The Government argued, based on a cost-benefit analysis, that 
depictions of animal cruelty should be considered a class of unprotected speech. Id. at 469–72. 
The Court rejected this argument in no uncertain terms. See id. at 470 (“As a free-floating test 
for First Amendment coverage, [an ad hoc cost-benefit analysis] is startling and dangerous.”). 
However, the Court did note that it is at least fair to describe the recognized categories of 
unprotected speech as reflecting just such an analysis, even if that description carries no real 
jurisprudential force. See id. at 470–71. And though the Court formally left open the door for 
the future recognition of categories of unprotected speech, it is hard to imagine what might 
qualify if depictions of animal torture do not. See id. at 472. Few types of speech reflect such a 
lopsided cost-benefit analysis, and it is difficult to imagine what sort of retelling of history might 
turn up a category of speech we have always forbidden, but never sufficiently identified. 
 3.  See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (holding unconstitutional the 
provision in the Virginia cross burning statute that treats any cross burning as prima facie 
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military funerals of fallen soldiers.5 Nor are these examples isolated. 
There is only one still-valid Court decision applying strict scrutiny to 
uphold what it recognized as a content-based restriction,6 and that 
case pitted free speech against national security interests.7 It is thus 
fair to say that once a federal court determines that a restriction is 
content-based,8 the restriction will fall. In almost every case, this 
 
evidence of intent to intimidate); R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (holding facially unconstitutional St. 
Paul’s ordinance prohibiting bias-motivated crime, including cross burning). 
 4.  See Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (concluding that the federal statute enacted to criminalize the 
commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty is overbroad and 
facially unconstitutional). 
 5.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (stating that the speech of church 
members who picketed near the funeral of a gay soldier is protected speech under the First 
Amendment). 
 6.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 189, 196 (1983) (“[T]he Court has invalidated almost every content-based restriction 
that it has considered in the past quarter-century.”). 
 7.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (holding that the 
material-support statute enacted by Congress, which prohibits providing material support or 
resources to foreign terrorist organizations, does not violate the plaintiffs’ free speech and is 
constitutional under the First Amendment). Somewhat confusingly, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion for the majority never states explicitly that it is applying strict scrutiny, despite the fact 
that this is the well-established test for content-based distinctions that do not fall within an 
exception to the First Amendment. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385–86, 395 (stating that strict 
scrutiny is appropriate for content-based distinctions). However, the Court explicitly states that 
it is applying a standard higher than “intermediate scrutiny,” Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2723, and the analysis generally proceeds as if the Court were applying strict scrutiny, 
albeit without evoking the familiar vocabulary of “compelling state interests” and “narrow 
tailoring.” 
 8.  However, this inquiry is sometimes murkier than might be supposed. See, e.g., R. 
George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a 
Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333, 337 (2006) (“[C]ourts [attempting to distinguish 
content-based from content neutral regulations] incompatibly talk both of focusing their inquiry 
on the text or face of the regulation, and of a broader judicial inquiry into the legislative intent, 
purpose, and justification of the regulation.”). Perhaps most tellingly, a circuit split has started 
to develop on this very issue. Some circuits focus on the text and operation of the statute, and 
have held that a regulation is content-based if a government actor must look to the content of 
the speech to determine whether the regulation applies. See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters. v. City 
of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 736 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e conclude that the zoning code’s definition 
of ‘sign’ is impermissibly content-based because the message conveyed determines whether the 
speech is subject to the restriction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Serv. Emps. Int’l 
Union v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A regulatory scheme that requires 
the government to examine the content of the message that is conveyed is content-based 
regardless of its motivating purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Conversely, others 
have held that an inquiry into legislative purpose is required. In these circuits, a regulation will 
be considered content-based—even if it openly distinguishes categories of speech—only if there 
was some discriminatory or censorial legislative intent. See, e.g., Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 
F.3d 294, 301–02 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Content neutrality bars only one particular sort of 
distinction—those made with a censorial intent to value some forms of speech over others to 
distort public debate, to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or to prohibit the expression of an [offensive or disagreeable] idea . . . .” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 
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classification is outcome-determinative. 
But there is more than a process of elimination to support the 
conclusion that content-neutral restrictions are the greater threat. As 
commentators have long observed, content-neutral speech restrictions 
can, in practice, be incredibly burdensome on free expression. Few 
areas of law illustrate this point as well as the recent case law of large 
political conventions and similar events, which is the focus of this 
Article. 
Political conventions provide a particularly good example of the 
burdens of content-neutral restrictions for three reasons. First, what is 
at stake is generally core political speech, which the Supreme Court 
has consistently recognized as “at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection.”9 Indeed, the Court has stated explicitly 
that political speech has “always rested on the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values”10 and is “entitled to special 
protection.”11 Thus, if anything, one would expect the application of a 
stricter legal standard, or at least a stricter application of the general 
content-neutral legal standard, for restrictions on expression at major 
political conventions. Yet that is not the case. 
Second, the key dangers presented by strict restrictions at large 
political conventions are exactly those presented by restrictions that 
are explicitly content-based—namely, that the government will seek 
to distort the marketplace of ideas and shape in a self-serving way the 
search for political truth.12 It is true that content-neutral regulations, 
by definition, do not depend on viewpoint. But the fact of the matter 
is the burdens of such regulations at political conventions fall 
disproportionately on the shoulders of dissent.13 Modern major 
 
622 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The plaintiffs argue that the ordinances . . . are content based because they 
distinguish between various types of signs—and thus various types of protected speech—by 
content. . . . There is simply nothing in the record to indicate that the distinctions . . . reflect a 
meaningful preference for one type of speech . . . .”). 
 9.  First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
 10.  Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); see also Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215 (“The 
First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))).  
 11.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983). 
 12.  See Stone, supra note 6, at 198. 
 13.  Nor is this mere legal hypochondria: In several cases, convention officials have barred 
everyone from entering within hundreds of yards of the convention site, except individuals given 
special credentials by those officials. See, e.g., ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1153 (D. Colo. 2008); Coal. to Protest the Democratic Nat’l Convention v. City of Boston 
(Coal. to Protest the DNC), 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65 (D. Mass. 2004); Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. 
JOHNSON 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2014  2:50 PM 
90 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 9 
political conventions are not debates—they are publicity 
extravaganzas, devoted to promoting the platform and candidate of a 
dominant political party. With all speech, across the board, confined 
by a content-neutral limitation, all that sees the light of day is the 
party orthodoxy. This is arguably the chief problem against which the 
First Amendment should guard.14 
Third, the body of case law surrounding large political 
conventions illustrates how contemporary First Amendment 
jurisprudence, despite common perceptions, is not nearly as protective 
of free expression as may be commonly thought. The doctrine 
governing time, manner, and place (TMP) restrictions, especially as 
applied to large political events such as national political conventions, 
has been deferential to government interests, and has generally 
privileged those interests over individual interests in free expression. 
That such a doctrine could develop around a constitutional 
amendment dedicated, perhaps above all else, to allowing dissenters 
to speak truth to power, is disconcertingly ironic. 
This Article addresses several aspects of that development. Part I 
reviews the general framework applicable to content-neutral TMP 
restrictions. Part II discusses two cases central to the development of 
this area of law. Part III describes general trends in the outcomes and 
analyses of key cases. Finally, Part IV suggests small changes that, if 
adopted, would make the doctrine more speech-protective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968–69 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Perhaps the most direct 
recognition of the targeting of protest came in Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado 
Springs, in which the court held that “[i]t was not impermissible for the City to draw a 
distinction between [non-protesters] and those seeking to protest the NATO conference, 
because the City made a reasonable assumption that protestors could pose more of a security 
risk to the conference than other persons.” 477 F.3d 1212, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 14.  See Stone, supra note 6, at 198. 
JOHNSON 2.15.2014 COPYRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2014  2:50 PM 
2013] THE LAW OF LARGE POLITICAL EVENTS 91 
I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Though the distinction between content-based and content-
neutral restrictions originally had an equal protection cast,15 the 
general framework for content-neutral TMP restrictions was settled 
early and has been relatively clear for some time.16 Restrictions are 
considered content-neutral when they are “justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech,” regardless of whether they 
have “an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not 
others.”17 Similarly, restrictions are considered content-neutral even 
when they create exceptions for certain categories of potential 
speakers, as long as those exceptions are independent of the content of 
any speech in which those speakers might engage.18 However, facially 
content-neutral restrictions cannot grant overly broad discretion to a 
regulating official, and must “contain adequate standards to guide the 
official’s decision and render it subject to effective judicial review.”19 
Regulations granting overly broad discretion are unconstitutional 
because that discretion can chill speech20 and can be used “to favor or 
 
 15.  See, e.g., Carey, 447 U.S. at 471 (finding that the Illinois statute was inconsistent “with 
the command of the Equal Protection Clause . . . . because the statute discriminate[d] among 
pickets based on the subject matter of their expression” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–95 (1972) (“Because Chicago treats some 
picketing differently from others, we analyze this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Kenneth Karst took this ideal seriously and famously 
argued that a principle of equality, understood as equal liberty, lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment and reflects the key First Amendment values of democratic self-governance, the 
search for truth, and autonomous self-expression. Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principle 
in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23 (1975). This ideal can partially explain the 
development of differential treatment for content-based and content-neutral regulations. Yet, 
the principle of equality (however understood) cannot, by itself, offer full protection for these 
values because they can still be undermined by restrictions that weigh heavily—if equally—
across all different types of messages.   
 16.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 771 (1976) (“We have often approved [TMP] restrictions . . . provided that they are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.”). 
 17.  E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986) (defining content-neutral regulations).  
 18.  See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a regulation requiring permits for events involving more than 
twenty individuals is content-neutral, despite an exception for “casual park use by visitors or 
tourists,” because the regulation “does not turn on the message, if any, espoused by visitors or 
tourists [but instead] refers to the manner in which groups larger than twenty assemble” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 19.  Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).  
 20.  City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988) (“[Such 
regulations can] intimidate[] parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and 
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disfavor speech based on its content.”21 
Once a restriction has been deemed a content-neutral restriction 
on the time, manner, or place of speech, that restriction will be upheld 
if it satisfies three requirements (the TMP elements).22 First, the law 
must serve a substantial government interest.23 Though there is no 
general test for what makes an interest constitutionally “substantial,” 
a number of interests have been deemed to meet this threshold 
including providing security, maintaining the orderly flow of traffic on 
streets and sidewalks, and preserving public facilities.24 Second, the 
restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.25 This is 
not the sort of narrow-tailoring analysis used in First Amendment 
cases that employ strict scrutiny,26 and there is no requirement that the 
government utilize the least restrictive measures.27 Instead, the 
government need only show a “reasonable fit” between the regulation 
and the interest served.28 Third, the restriction must leave open ample 
alternatives for conveying the same message.29 This inquiry is 
 
power are never actually abused.”). 
 21.  Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323; see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 
153 (1969) (“[Unfettered discretion allows officials] to roam at will, dispensing or withholding 
permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade according to their own opinions . . . .”).  
 22.  E.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.  
 23.  Courts sometimes refer to the need for a “significant” government interest, rather than 
a “substantial” one. See, e.g., ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. 
Colo. 2008). The Supreme Court has used the terms interchangeably. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 
(stating that the regulation must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 24.  See infra notes 78–84 and accompanying text. 
 25.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 26.  See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less 
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government 
may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). 
 27.  E.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (“Regulations that burden 
speech incidentally or control the time, place, and manner of expression . . . . [are not invalid] 
simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on 
speech.”). 
 28.  ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
 29. E.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (“[Speech] 
regulations . . . [must] leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, some cases merely speak of a need for 
“adequate” alternatives. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (“[A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining 
modes of communication are inadequate.”). Although these different terms can be (and have 
been) used selectively to frame the issue, an easy way to square this variable use of terminology 
is to hold that alternatives are not “adequate” unless they are “ample.” See, e.g., City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (“[Content-neutral regulation] must leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication. . . . [W]e are not persuaded 
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generally fact-intensive,30 and it is unclear whether or not there is any 
constitutional right to reach one’s intended audience.31 
II. TWO KEY CASES 
Though the Supreme Court has never addressed restrictions on 
major political conventions, lower federal courts have applied the 
general framework just outlined to all recent cases concerning large 
political conventions. Two cases are key to understanding the overall 
development of this area of law, and they should be considered in 
tandem. The first, Menotti v. City of Seattle,32 demonstrates how 
quickly a large political event can inspire violent protest. Combined 
with the September 11th attacks, it should be no surprise that security 
interests were at the forefront of post-2001 lower court opinions. The 
second case, Coalition to Protest the DNC v. City of Boston,33 
illustrates just how far courts would allow government to go in the 
name of security—and at the expense of free speech interests. 
A. Menotti v. City of Seattle 
In Menotti, the Ninth Circuit addressed the local government’s 
response to the riots that broke out in the early days of the 1999 
World Trade Organization (WTO) conference. The City faced serious 
 
that adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off.” 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 30.  E.g., ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (“[T]he Court discerns that the ‘ample 
alternatives’ element is a multi-factor, fact-intensive inquiry.”). 
 31.  See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) 
(“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times 
and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). The Supreme Court has not clearly decided 
the issue and lower courts have reached different conclusions. Compare Harrington v. City of 
Brentwood, 726 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The key for purposes of the adequate-
alternatives analysis is whether the proffered alternatives allow the speaker to reach its intended 
audience.” (citation omitted)), with McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (“In the 
last analysis, there is no constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted particularized 
access to their desired audience. As long as adequate alternative means of communication exist, 
the First Amendment is not infringed.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 32.  409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). Though this case does not technically address a large 
political convention, but rather the riots at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999, 
Menotti has been discussed in several later cases addressing large political events. See, e.g., 
Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1224 (“[T]he City made a reasonable assumption that 
protestors could pose more of a security risk to the conference than other persons, an 
assumption that, for example, finds some support given the violent protests surrounding the 
World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle, Washington.”); Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. 
Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004) (“[D]esignated protest or demonstration zones is a relatively 
recent innovation; they have apparently become routine at large political events ever since the 
1999 World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle.”).  
 33.  327 F. Supp. 2d 61(D. Mass. 2004). 
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problems: Despite the fact that over ninety-nine percent of 
demonstrators were well-behaved and orderly,34 parts of Seattle 
descended into “seeming war zones.”35 Within the first day of the 
WTO conference, this one percent of rogue protesters looted and 
broke windows at retail stores, started fires in the streets and in 
dumpsters, then blocked fire trucks from entering the area, and even 
assaulted WTO delegates and the driver of a garbage truck.36 A few of 
these violent protesters were “well-organized and . . . coordinated,”37 
and some were even armed with Molotov cocktails.38 
The police responded with tear gas, beanbag guns, rubber bullets,39 
and about 300 arrests.40 Seattle Mayor Paul Schell declared a civil 
emergency, imposed a general curfew, and the Governor called out 
the National Guard.41 A sizeable section of downtown Seattle was 
closed off to everyone except WTO delegates and staff members, the 
owners and employees of businesses in the section, and emergency 
and safety personnel,42 though this closure was soon limited to 
banning only protesters.43 Violent protest eased, but did not stop 
entirely.44 
Confronted with both individual lawsuits and a class action 
seeking damages for First Amendment violations,45 the Ninth Circuit 
generally affirmed the government’s actions.46 As a threshold matter, 
the court held that the curfew and ban were content-neutral, even 
though they predominately affected anti-WTO protesters,47 because 
the “literal command of the restraint” was content-neutral;48 
 
 34.  Menotti, 409 F.3d. at 1123. 
 35.  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36.  Id. at 1121–23. 
 37.  Id. at 1123. 
 38.  Id. at 1120. In several situations, nonviolent protesters facilitated violent protest by 
forming a buffer between violent protesters and police. Id. at 1132. 
 39.  Id. at 1122. 
 40.  Id. at 1126. 
 41.  Id. at 1124. 
 42.  Id. at 1125. 
 43.  Id. at 1125–26. 
 44.  Id. at 1126. 
 45.  Id. at 1117–18. 
 46.  Id. at 1118. The court held that the City’s actions were constitutional on their face, but 
that there was a material issue of fact regarding their constitutionality as applied to the specific 
plaintiffs in the case. Id. 
 47.  Id. at 1129 (noting that Order No. 3, which closed off sections of Seattle to protesters, 
but not to delegates, business-owners, or employees, “predominantly affected protest[e]rs with 
anti-WTO views,” but this “did not render it content based”). 
 48.  Id. However, the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of government intent is somewhat 
confusing. In one sentence, it wrote that “the text of Order No. 3 is not in dispute, and it does 
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accordingly, the TMP framework applied. The court then went on to 
hold that the government had significant interests in maintaining 
security,49 and that the blanket prohibition on protest was narrowly 
tailored—despite its large geographic scope—because it had become 
“unrealistic to expect police to be able to distinguish, minute by 
minute, those protestors with benign intentions and those with violent 
intentions.”50 And the ability to protest elsewhere in downtown 
Seattle provided protesters with adequate alternatives.51 
B. Coalition to Protest the DNC v. City of Boston 
The second key case is Coalition to Protest the DNC, in which a 
Massachusetts district court upheld severe restrictions on expression 
at the 2004 Democratic National Convention (DNC) against 
expedited pre-Convention challenges seeking injunctive relief.52 The 
most important of these restrictions was the creation of a designated 
“demonstration zone” for protesters. Although protest was also 
allowed within a separate “soft security zone,” capacity there was 
limited,53 and the demonstration zone provided the best access to 
DNC delegates.54 
 
 
not favor one content over another.” Id. With this sentence, the court appears to commit itself 
to a form of textualism in which the government’s motive is irrelevant to the analysis. The court 
even underscores this commitment with a footnote stating that it “will not strike down an 
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.” Id. at 1130 
n.29 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). However, immediately after that first sentence, the court wrote that “[t]he purpose of 
enacting Order No. 3 had everything to do with the need to restore and maintain civic order, 
and nothing to do with the content of [the protesters’] message.” Id. at 1129. This reference is in 
accord with the long-established need for a significant government interest.   
 49.  Id. at 1131 (“No one could seriously dispute that the government has a significant 
interest in maintaining public order; indeed this is a core duty that the government owes its 
citizens.”).  
 50.  Id. at 1134. This sort of blanket prohibition is difficult to square with existing First 
Amendment concepts like overbreadth. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 
255 (2002) (“The argument, in essence, is that protected speech may be banned as a means to 
ban unprotected speech. This analysis turns the First Amendment upside down.”). 
 51.  Menotti, 409 F.3d. at 1141. 
 52.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64–65 (D. Mass. 2004). The First Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s holding in Coalition to Protest the DNC in Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City 
of Boston, 378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).  
 53.  Coalition to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 65. In addition, within the “soft 
security zone,” tables and chairs were prohibited, and demonstrations involving more than 
twenty individuals required a permit. See id. at 65–66. 
 54.  Id. at 74. One edge of the demonstration zone was “the only available location 
providing a direct interface between demonstrators, and the area where delegates will enter and 
leave the [convention site].” 
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Conditions in the demonstration zone were oppressive: The 
demonstration zone was surrounded by two rows of concrete barriers 
topped with eight foot chain-link fencing, and the outer fence was 
coated with a dense fabric to prevent demonstrators from throwing 
liquids at delegates.55 Large portions of this fabric limited visibility of 
any passers-by56 and prevented demonstrators from handing out 
materials.57 Visibility was further reduced by the presence of a “two-
story ‘media village’” between the demonstration zone and the 
convention site.58 In addition, much of the demonstration zone was 
located directly beneath railroad tracks, which were wrapped with 
razor wire and patrolled by armed police and National Guardsmen.59 
As a result of the tracks and the supporting girders, much of the space 
within the demonstration zone was unfit for many types of 
demonstrations, and the number of people who could demonstrate 
effectively was limited.60 
The district court expressed concern over these conditions.61 At 
various times, it likened the demonstration zone to an “internment 
camp,”62 and described it as “an offense to the spirit of the First 
Amendment.”63 Yet, despite these reservations, the court upheld the 
use of the demonstration zone as “reasonable” and thus 
constitutionally acceptable, in light of the circumstances: 
The double fence is reasonable in light of past experience in which 
demonstrators have pushed over a single fence. A second fence 
may prevent this altogether, or at least give police officers more 
time to respond and protect the delegates. The liquid dispersion 
fabric is reasonable in light of past experience in which 
demonstrators have squirted liquids such as bleach or urine at 
 
 55.  Id. at 67. 
 56.  Id. at 66 (“The purpose of this [fabric], according to the [Boston Police Department] is 
‘to protect the delegates and other attendees, and to prevent hostile viewers from determining 
the strength and positioning of . . . law enforcement assets.’” (second alteration in original)). 
 57.  Id. at 68 (“It will be . . . completely impossible to pass a leaflet from the 
[demonstration zone] to a delegate or other DNC guest, even one who wants to approach the 
edge of the [demonstration zone] to receive the literature.”). 
 58.  Id. at 72. 
 59.  Id. at 67. 
 60.  Id. (“Although the City calculated that some 4,000 persons could be accommodated in 
the entire [demonstration zone], this effectively usable area can accommodate approximately 
1,500 persons.”). 
 61.  Photos of the demonstration zone are available online. See Emily Steinmetz, 
Democratic? National Convention Comes to Denver, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (July 3, 2008), 
http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/democratic-national-convention-comes-to-denver.  
 62.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 74. 
 63.  Id. at 87. 
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delegates or police. The overhead netting is reasonable in light of 
past experience in which demonstrators have thrown objects over 
fences. The razor wire atop the [railroad] tracks . . . is reasonable in 
light of the possibility of demonstrators climbing upon the tracks 
and using them as an access point to breach the hard zone 
perimeter and/or rain objects on delegates, media, or law 
enforcement personnel from above.64 
In short, each of these restrictions was reasonable, despite the lack 
of any specific threats of such tactics,65 because “there [was] no way to 
‘tweak’ the [demonstration zone] to improve plaintiffs’ free speech 
opportunities without creating a safety hazard”66 and protesters 
retained “other opportunities for communication.”67 Accordingly, the 
security plans, though onerous, were constitutional. In so holding, the 
district court set the stage for equally oppressive measures at later 
political events. 
III. GENERAL TRENDS IN THE CASE LAW 
Since the WTO riots described in Menotti, and especially since 
Coalition to Protest the DNC, federal courts have continued to apply 
the content-neutral TMP framework in a way that privileges 
government regulations over free expression.68 For example, in ACLU 
of Colorado v. Denver,69 the District of Colorado upheld a security 
plan that limited protest to a “Public/Demonstration Zone” 
surrounded by concrete barriers and two rows of fencing.70 At that 
location, the convention was not even visible, and the only access 
demonstrators had to the delegates was from 200 feet away as the 
delegates walked from their buses into the convention.71 Similarly, in 
Marcavage v. City of New York,72 the Southern District of New York 
upheld the arrests of two anti-abortion demonstrators, who peacefully 
 
 64.  Id. at 75. 
 65.  See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004) (“The appellant 
points out, correctly, that there is no evidence in the record that the City had information 
indicating that demonstrators intended to use such tactics at the Convention.”). 
 66.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 76. 
 67.  Id. at 75. 
 68.  For a review of some of the tactics used to crackdown on protesters at these 
conventions, see generally Joshua Rissman, Put it on Ice: Chilling Free Speech at National 
Conventions, 27 LAW & INEQ. 413 (2009). 
 69.  569 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 70.  Id. at 1149. 
 71.  Id. at 1155–56. 
 72.  Marcavage v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 4945(RJS), 2010 WL 3910355, *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010). 
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carried signs no larger than four-by-six feet, because they refused to 
move from a “no expressive activity zone” to the designated 
“demonstration area” two blocks from the convention.73 Other cases 
are similar.74 Only two cases, Service Employees International Union v. 
City of Los Angeles (SEIU)75 and Stauber v. City of New York76—both 
of which were decided before Coalition to Protest the DNC—favored 
the First Amendment plaintiffs (and these cases may have limited 
reach).77 
 
 
 
 73.  Id. at *10. 
 74.  See Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d 
1014, 1023–24 (D. Minn. 2008) (upholding the decision to deny a requested parade permit and 
to grant instead a permit for a different route, because it would slow traffic and divert police 
resources); Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (upholding the denial of a permit for a rally on the night before the Republican National 
Convention started because the number of attendees might exceed estimates, and this might 
damage the lawn at the site of the rally, especially in the event of rain). Similar decisions have 
been rendered in cases dealing with large gatherings other than national political conventions. 
See, e.g., Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1217, 1226 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (protesters outside a NATO conference); Defending Animal Rights Today and 
Tomorrow v. Wash. Sports and Entm’t LP, 821 F. Supp. 2d 97, 109–10 (D.D.C. 2011) (animal 
rights protesters outside a circus); United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. 
Supp. 2d 19, 30–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (peace protesters outside the United Nations Building). 
 75.  114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968, 975 (C.D. Cal. 2000).  
 76.  No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, *33 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).  
 77.  The First Amendment-friendly result in Service Employees International Union v. City 
of Los Angeles is likely attributable to two things. First, the restrictions involved were arguably 
more severe than even those employed at the 2004 DNC in Boston: 185 acres (8 million square 
feet) surrounding the convention were made off-limits to demonstrators, and protest was 
restricted to a “secured zone” over 250 yards away, with only a blocked view of the convention, 
and on the other side of a major highway. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 968–72. 
Thus, to the extent it establishes a ceiling on the restrictions that can be imposed in the name of 
security, that ceiling is high and few measures are prohibited. Second, this decision was written 
in 2000, before the terror attacks of September 11th. It is not inconceivable that a First 
Amendment plaintiff would have lost on the exact same set of facts in 2004, or even 2010. The 
reach of Stauber is similarly limited for two reasons. First, the police tactics addressed in Stauber 
were not unique to the Republican National Convention (RNC), but had been employed more 
widely. During a number of demonstrations in 2003 and 2004, the NYPD enforced a policy of 
shutting down streets and sidewalks while making no or minimal efforts to tell attendees how 
they could otherwise access the events. Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *8–9. Even more 
troubling, the NYPD commonly used barricades to create “pens” with only a single opening. Id. 
at *9–10. Demonstrators often had difficulty leaving, and were sometimes told that they were 
not allowed to leave the pen at all. Id. at *25. Had these practices been employed only at the 
RNC and not used more widely, the court may have decided differently. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, the chief of the NYPD testified at trial that allowing individuals to enter and 
exit the pens “under controlled circumstances” would not undermine law enforcement. Id. at 
*10, *28. Largely based on the chief’s testimony, the court concluded that “no security, safety or 
organizational interests would be harmed by the NYPD making efforts to assure greater access 
by demonstrators to and from pens.” Id. at *29.  
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This overall pattern has resulted from several notable trends in 
how courts have analyzed each of the three TMP elements. The next 
section will summarize these trends and offer brief examples of how 
they have thwarted First Amendment interests. 
A.  The Government Interest 
Regarding the first element—that any restriction must serve a 
substantial government interest—two trends stand out. First, courts 
have identified a broad array of interests that qualify as at least 
“substantial” or “significant.” These interests have included 
maintaining security,78 controlling traffic on streets and sidewalks,79 
managing and maintaining park facilities80 and other public spaces,81 
reducing excessive noise,82 avoiding visual clutter,83 and, potentially, 
preserving an environment in which business can be conducted 
effectively.84 Because of this breadth, the first TMP element has been 
uniformly satisfied in the context of large political conventions. 
Frankly, it is difficult to imagine any large gathering in which at least 
one of these interests would not be at issue. 
Second, where implicated, the government’s interest in security 
has weighed heavily.85 Some courts have referred to this interest as “a 
core duty that the government owes its citizens,”86 whereas others 
 
 78. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1131 (9th Cir. 2005) (“No one could seriously 
dispute that the government has a significant interest in maintaining public order.”). 
 79.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1163 (D. Colo. 2008) (citing 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1997)). 
 80.  Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984); Paulsen v. 
Gotbam, 982 F.2d 825, 830 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 81.  ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 296). 
 82.  Id. at 1162 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1989)). 
 83.  See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984) (“[T]he visual 
assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public 
property . . . constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City’s power to prohibit.”). 
 84.  See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1131–32 & n.34 (“The City [has] an interest in seeing that the . 
. . delegates ha[ve] the opportunity to conduct their business at the chosen venue . . . .”).  
 85.  As commentators have noted, “[t]he recent trend is for large-scale political events to 
be designated as ‘National Special Security Events’ by the President, which makes the Secret 
Service the lead federal agency in charge of the security for the event.” Joseph D. Herrold, 
Note, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the “Caging” of First Amendment Rights, 
54 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 978 (2006). This development is troubling, not for doctrinal reasons, but 
because this has sometimes led to blatant viewpoint discrimination. For example, at a speech in 
West Virginia, the Secret Service ordered the arrest of two protesters for refusing to remove t-
shirts critical of President George W. Bush. Rank v. Jenkins, No. Civ.A.2:04 0997, 2006 WL 
515533, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 28, 2006).  
 86.  Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1131. 
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have noted that 9/11 changed not just the political landscape,87 but the 
constitutional landscape as well.88 In several cases, despite opening 
with language suggesting that security concerns do not automatically 
trump expressive rights,89 courts have been explicitly deferential to the 
needs of law enforcement. In Coalition to Protest the DNC, the court 
opined that “the police must have adequate flexibility to make 
judgments on the street concerning any emergency or public safety 
issues, and [courts] should not fashion an injunction to control that 
discretion.”90 The court was similarly complaisant in ACLU, noting 
that “[s]imply put, some degree of deference must be afforded to the 
government’s judgment as to the most effective means for achieving 
its security goals.”91 Cases addressing restrictions at other types of 
political events have been similar.92 Just as troubling, the evidence 
required to establish a security interest has been minimal.93 
In some cases, security concerns provided a general backdrop—in 
addition to being an element of the TMP test—against which the 
other elements were appraised.94 This means that security was 
 
 87.  As James J. Knicely and John W. Whitehead have observed, “[i]n a climate of fear of 
threatened terrorist attacks, the potential for adverse political accountability by an unforgiving 
polity is even higher if security measures fail to prevent disaster, particularly if the measures are 
perceived as being undermined by an unelected Federal judiciary.” James J. Knicely & John W. 
Whitehead, The Caging of Free Speech in America, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 455, 468 
(2005). 
 88.  See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (Lipez, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he events of 9/11 and the constant reminders in the popular media of security 
alerts color perceptions of the risks around us, including the perceptions of judges. The risks of 
violence and the dire consequences of that violence seem more probable and more substantial 
than they were before 9/11.”).  
 89.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. Colo. 2008) (“The 
term ‘security’ cannot simply be brandished as a talisman to justify all burdens on speech.” 
(citing Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13)). 
 90.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 76 (D. Mass. 2004).  
 91.  ACLU of Colo., 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of 
Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2007); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13).  
 92.  See, e.g., United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Court will not second guess or substitute its judgment for that of the 
NYPD.”). 
 93.  See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 13 (upholding measures to guard against 
specific tactics even though “there [was] no evidence in the record that the City had information 
indicating that demonstrators intended to use such tactics”). 
 94.  See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e apply 
the ample alternatives test with a practical recognition of the dire facts confronting the city 
[during the Seattle WTO riots].”); Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. 
Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028 (D. Minn. 2008) (“The ample alternative channels analysis 
cannot be conducted in an objective vacuum, but instead it must give ‘practical recognition’ to 
the facts giving rise to the restriction on speech.” (quoting Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d 
at 1226)).  
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essentially double-counted—once as an element and again as a factor 
in the analyses of the other two elements. 
The best example to illustrate how this can work concerns not a 
large political convention, but a banned protest outside a NATO 
conference. In Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado 
Springs,95 the Tenth Circuit actually triple-counted security concerns. 
First, regarding the government’s interest in prohibiting protest within 
several hundred yards of the conference,96 the court held that “the 
City’s security interest is of the highest order,”97 especially in light of 
the fact that defense officials from several countries would be 
gathered together.98 Second, regarding the narrow-tailoring analysis, 
the court opined that “the significance of the government interest 
bears an inverse relationship to the rigor of the narrowly tailored 
analysis.”99 Third, regarding the existence of ample alternatives, the 
court opined that “given “the City’s need to . . . provide conference 
security, we must determine whether the alternative protest [site] was 
an adequate alternative.”100 Thus, the government interest in security 
influenced the court’s holding on each element of the TMP restriction 
analysis. 
B.  Narrow Tailoring 
Regarding the second element—that any restriction must be 
narrowly tailored to serve the identified government interest—two 
general trends are noteworthy. First, these analyses have been 
uniformly fact-intensive.101 Accordingly, and as some courts have 
explicitly acknowledged,102 the precedential value of any particular 
 
 95.  477 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 96.  The protest was limited: Six individuals wanted to conduct a peace vigil on the 
sidewalk across the street from the NATO conference, in which they would hold banners for 
one hour. See id. at 1218. Because they were banned from protesting outside the conference, 
they had little choice but to hold their vigil at a security checkpoint, located several blocks from 
the conference, with no direct line of sight to the conference. Id. at 1218–19. Because they were 
effectively invisible to their target audience, they asked officers to at least inform conference 
attendees of their vigil, but “the officers declined.” Id. at 1219.  
 97.  Id. at 1220.  
 98.  See id. at 1221. 
 99.  Id.  
 100.  Id. at 1226. 
 101.  See, e.g., Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004) (describing 
the case law on political conventions as “extremely factbound”); see also Menotti v. City of 
Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1133 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The [large] size of the restricted zone cannot 
sensibly be evaluated without considering the size of the area in which delegates were housed 
and had to move freely in order to do the work of the WTO conference.”). 
 102.  See, e.g., Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp. 
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opinion is limited, and restrictions held constitutional in one context 
may be invalidated in another.103 This, in turn, has given courts free 
rein to reach the decision that seems most appropriate in a given 
situation, with few constraints from precedent. Courts have thus been 
able to couch in the normal vocabulary of the TMP elements what 
actually operated as a reasonableness test104 or an interest-balancing 
test, rather than a proper elements-based analysis.105 
Some courts have openly stated as much. In ACLU, for example, 
the court conceded that “closing down [a major highway] to the daily 
parades during the [DNC] w[ould] burden the expressive rights of 
marchers,” but the court did not find that the burden was “substantial 
when weighted against the Defendants’ interests in emergency 
access.”106 Similarly, in Bl(a)ck Tea Society v. City of Boston,107 the First 
Circuit approved the “balance of [security] and other factors” 108 
employed by the lower court in Coalition to Protest the DNC.109 SEIU 
also referred to a need to “balance . . . the competing interests,” 
though the district court for the Central District of California 
eventually held in favor of the First Amendment plaintiffs.110 Other 
cases dealing with large events besides national political conventions 
have employed comparable language and reasoning.111 
 
2d 1014, 1022 (D. Minn. 2008) (referring to “the necessity of a fact-specific inquiry”). 
 103.  See, e.g., id. (“Time-place-manner restrictions that may be constitutionally permissible 
at one site and event may be held constitutionally infirm at another site and event.” (citing Hill 
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728)).  
 104.  See Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (stating why each individual 
restriction imposed was “reasonable” in light of past experience). 
 105.  Such interest-balancing analyses are not entirely foreign to First Amendment cases, 
and they play a role in cases involving speech by government employees on manners of public 
concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (“Our task . . . is to seek a balance 
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). However, interest-balancing seems to be limited to such cases, and the Supreme 
Court has recently rejected the use of balancing tests in deciding other First Amendment 
questions. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (determining whether 
a category of speech deserves First Amendment Protection); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 
132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291 (2012) (addressing whether a union can collect dues from non-consenting 
individuals).  
 106.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1186 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 107.  378 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 108.  Id. at 14. 
 109.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
 110.  Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 972 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
 111.  See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We 
recognize that our decision takes into account a balance of the competing considerations of 
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Second, and perhaps more importantly, these narrow-tailoring 
analyses have been undemanding. Courts addressing these speech 
restrictions have commonly emphasized that there is no requirement 
that the government employ the least restrictive measures,112 and that 
the government need only show a “reasonable fit” between the 
government interest and the restriction on speech.113 
Citizens for Peace in Space presents the best example of an 
undemanding narrow-tailoring analysis. There, the Tenth Circuit 
considered a challenge to a blanket ban on demonstration within 
several hundred yards of a NATO conference.114 To guard against the 
“catastrophic risk”115 provided by the “worst case scenario”116 of “a 
terrorist attack utilizing explosives,”117 the City of Denver created a 
“security zone” that extended several blocks from a NATO 
conference site in all directions.118 The group Citizens for Peace in 
Space sought to conduct an hour-long peace vigil on the sidewalk 
across the street from the conference, in which six individuals would 
hold banners.119 Though no other group had asked to protest within 
the secured zone,120 the City refused their request, partially because 
allowing their protest might encourage other groups to protest as 
well.121 The possible alternative of using a permitting scheme was 
insufficient because it would have required a diversion of resources 
and personnel.122 This blanket prohibition was upheld as narrowly 
 
expression and order. But we do not think the Constitution requires otherwise.”); United for 
Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The City’s 
significant interest in . . . safety [outside the UN building], especially in this time of heightened 
security, outweigh[s] the restrictions on the Plaintiff.”). 
 112.  E.g., Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1138 (“A time, place, and manner restriction does not violate 
the First Amendment simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less 
burdensome on speech.” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985)); 
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First 
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or 
in any manner that may be desired.” (citations omitted)). 
 113.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1179 (D. Colo. 2008).  
 114.  See Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1226 (10th 
Cir. 2007).  
 115.  Id. at 1225. 
 116.  Id. at 1224. 
 117.  Id. at 1217. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id. at 1218. 
 120.  See id. at 1223. 
 121.  Id. at 1218. 
 122.  See id. at 1225 (“Though we agree that some content-neutral permitting system could 
have been enacted, we do not agree with the Citizens that such a system is an obvious 
alternative that easily could have been utilized without diverting resources and personnel.”). 
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tailored because another group might seek to protest NATO, that 
group might become violent, and that violence might have been more 
than the City could handle.123 Yet to ban one protest because it might 
encourage other protest is patently inconsistent with general notions 
of narrow tailoring. 
Besides being extremely deferential, these analyses have 
occasionally been loose and undisciplined. In at least two cases, courts 
suggested that the plaintiffs, rather than the government, bore the 
burden of proof on the issue of narrow tailoring.124 In another, the 
court suggested that the narrow-tailoring analysis was closer to a 
rational basis test, such that the restriction would be valid so long as it 
had the desired effect.125 On the whole, this looseness, like the lack of 
precedential constraints, has favored the government’s interests over 
those of demonstrators. 
C.  Ample Alternatives 
Regarding the third element—that any restriction must leave 
open ample or adequate alternatives of communication—again, two 
related trends are of special importance. First, as with the narrow-
 
 123.  See id. at 1224 (rejecting the contention “that all protest groups would be peaceful and 
law-abiding” as an unrealistic “best-case scenario”).  
 124.  See Marcavage v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 4945(RJS), 2010 WL 3910355, *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (“Because Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge or engage the situation 
specific inquiry of intermediate scrutiny, the Court also finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed 
alternative is neither reasonable nor constitutionally required.”); Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. 
City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Nor has the [plaintiff] established 
. . . that the Parks Department’s denial of its application was not narrowly tailored to achieve 
the City’s significant interest of managing and maintaining the Great Lawn [in Central Park].”). 
There is some Supreme Court language to support this reasoning, at least regarding the 
requirement that ample alternatives for expression remain. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (“That the city’s limitations on volume may reduce to some 
degree the potential audience for respondent’s speech is of no consequence, for there has been 
no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate.”). However, later 
Supreme Court cases (including those citing Ward), have stated that the burden of proof in 
analyzing content-neutral restrictions falls on the government. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting 
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (“[T]he Government still bears the burden of showing 
that the remedy it has adopted does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to 
further [the government’s] interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 125.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1179 (D. Colo. 2008) (“The 
Court agrees that the closure of streets inside and adjacent to the [site of the DNC] is a 
reasonable fit to address concerns that people may obstruct traffic to or from the Convention 
grounds; one cannot obstruct a street if no one has access to it.”). If such reasoning were sound, 
then, the entire city of Denver could have been shut down, because this would presumably 
provide a safer convention site than would closing down only parts of it. The proper question 
for a narrow-tailoring test, of course, is not whether the measure actually does what it is 
supposed to do, but whether it does substantially more than it must.  
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tailoring requirement, courts have noted that the “ample alternatives” 
inquiry is heavily fact-dependent.126 This means that each case is 
largely unhinged from precedent, and courts have considerable 
discretion to decide what is constitutional and what is not based on 
the circumstances at hand, with little input from past decisions.127 
Without such restrictions, courts have also broadly construed what 
qualifies as “ample.” For example, the ability to speak to media 
outlets,128 to protest in other locations in the city,129 or to protest 
outside the hotel rooms of event attendees130 has often been enough 
to justify restrictions on protest near the target audience. The 
existence of restrictive demonstration zones has qualified as providing 
adequate alternative outlets.131 The only real requirement seems to be 
that the ability to convey the desired message not be wholly closed 
off.132 As a result of these broad readings—and the low threshold for 
adequacy—it is difficult to imagine a realistic contemporary scenario 
in which protesters would not have adequate alternative outlets. Any 
demonstrators with messages that depend on a specific time and place 
for effective delivery, or that seek to convey a message to the 
delegates themselves, are simply out of luck. 
 
 
 126.  E.g., id. at 1164 (“[T]he Court discerns that the ‘ample alternatives’ element is a multi-
factor, fact-intensive inquiry.”).  
 127.  However, this has not been uniformly true. For example, in Coalition to March on the 
RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, the court explicitly reviewed the degree of restraint 
imposed on protesters’ messages in prior cases, and how that compared to the channels 
available to protesters there. See 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1028–30 (D. Minn. 2008) (comparing 
alternative channels in prior cases to the ones available to the plaintiffs). 
 128.  Id. at 1029 (“[M]edia may afford ample alternatives to firsthand expression at high 
profile events.”); see also Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (“At 
a high-profile event, such as the [DNC], messages expressed beyond the first-hand sight of the 
delegates nonetheless have a propensity to reach the delegates through television, radio, the 
press, the internet, and other outlets.”). But see Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1174 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e should dispel any notion that media interest in an event can be a 
substitute for constitutionally-required alternative avenues of communication. . . . Public 
protests are at the heart of the First Amendment and are critical for incubating civic 
engagement and encouraging spirited debate.”). 
 129.  See id. at 1141 (finding that other protest locations throughout Washington were ample 
alternatives to the downtown area). 
 130.  See id.  
 131.  See ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1182 (2008) (finding that a 
restricted “Public/Demonstration Zone” presents an adequate alternative method of 
communication). 
 132.  See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1138 (“[T]he Supreme Court generally will not strike down a 
governmental action for failure to leave open ample alternative channels of communication 
unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire medium of public expression across 
the landscape of a particular community or setting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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Second, most federal courts have held that protesters at political 
conventions do not have any particular right to reach their intended 
audience.133 Although these holdings have usually been phrased in 
general terms,134 or in terms suggesting that the protesters sought 
recognition of a “special” right beyond what others enjoy,135 the end 
result has been the same: There has been very little practical 
recognition of a right to reach the target audience. For all these 
reasons, even very strict restrictions on speech have been upheld in 
federal courts. 
IV. BETTER ANALYSES AND BETTER DOCTRINE 
If the current case law on national political conventions has gone 
too far in favoring government interests over political protest, what 
can we do about it now? Part of the answer has to be for courts to 
offer better analyses. To start, courts should insist on placing burdens 
of proof on the government, particularly regarding the scope and 
intensity of the government’s interests, and whether or not restrictions 
are narrowly tailored.136 Government actors are in a much better 
position to offer evidence regarding their interests, especially security 
interests. They are also in a better position to show what limits they 
face regarding resources, and why ostensibly feasible, and less 
restrictive, alternatives—such as permitting schemes, or bans on 
 
 133.  E.g., id. at 1139 n.49 (“[W]e hold that there is no constitutional requirement that 
protestors be allowed to reach their designated audience in the precise manner of their 
choosing.”); Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A]lthough the 
opportunity to interact directly with the [target audience] by, say, moving among them and 
distributing literature would doubtless have facilitated the demonstrators’ ability to reach their 
intended audience, there is no constitutional requirement that demonstrators be granted that 
sort of particularized access.”). Outside of the specific context of large political events, several 
circuits have held that alternatives are not adequate unless they allow the speaker to reach her 
target audience. See, e.g., Harrington v. City of Brentwood, 726 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“The key for purposes of the adequate-alternatives analysis is whether the proffered 
alternatives allow the speaker to reach its intended audience.” (citation omitted)); Marcavage v. 
City of Phila., 481 F. App’x. 742, 747–48 (3d Cir. 2012); Sarre v. City of New Orleans, 420 F. 
App’x 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2011). Oddly enough, the Ninth Circuit has seemingly changed course 
since its holding in Menotti. See, e.g., Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 858 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“[A]n alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the intended audience.” 
(quoting Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
 134.  See, e.g., Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1139 n.49. 
 135.  See, e.g., Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y, 378 F.3d at 14 (“[T]here is no constitutional requirement 
that demonstrators be granted . . . particularized access.”). 
 136.  See, e.g., Stauber v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 9162(RWS), 2004 WL 1593870, *26 
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004) (“Because a time, place, and manner restriction exists, the defendants 
bear the burden of demonstrating that [it] is narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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certain materials within a given distance of the event—would not 
actually work or would be too burdensome. This would help prevent a 
general invocation of “security” from operating as a magic word that 
justifies even blanket prohibitions on protest in the absence of 
specific threats. 
Similarly, courts need to recall that the TMP framework is a test 
with elements, and not a balancing test pitting expressive rights 
against government interests.137 General reasonableness inquiries are 
the province of the Fourth Amendment,138 not the First.139 This also 
means that security cannot provide a general context within which the 
TMP analysis is conducted, and serve as an element within that test.140 
The needs of government—including security—are already built in to 
the analysis. 
These two changes are necessary, and relatively easy given current 
doctrine, but they are only a first step. Although some commentators 
have proposed radically overhauling the existing framework,141 this is 
 
 137.  See, e.g., Stauber, 2004 WL 1593870, at *29 (noting that the elements of the TMP 
analysis “are stated by the Supreme Court in the conjunctive rather than in the disjunctive”). 
 138.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (“The touchstone of our 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of 
the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 139.  See supra note 105. 
 140.  See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text. 
 141.  R. George Wright, for example, has proposed ditching entirely the distinction between 
content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions in favor of one that looks at “realistic 
repressive potential.” As he has summarized his approach: 
[C]ourts should be much more willing to make and defend their best informed 
judgments as to the realistic repressive potential of the speech restriction in question. 
Once this realistic repressive potential is judicially assessed, the most appropriate 
overall judicial test of the speech restriction can be selected and applied, regardless of 
whether the speech restriction would be characterized as [content-based] or [content-
neutral] under current practice.  
Wright, supra note 8, at 335–36 (emphasis added). Such an approach offers several clear 
benefits. For one, it seems truer to the Supreme Court’s recognition that political speech 
warrants special attention. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (stating 
that political speech lies “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection”). For another, this 
approach would move the focus from both the intent of the legislature and the text of the 
regulation to the likely effect. That being said, there are several difficulties that would have to 
be resolved. One is how to put this general standard into practice. What test(s) would apply 
once the judge had assessed the “likely repressive potential”? A second is the difficulty of the 
factual analysis the court will be required to conduct. Any inquiry into the “realistic repressive 
potential” would likely be fact-intensive and require no small amount of speculation. Because of 
this, what has been criticized as a legally convoluted doctrine, see, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Content 
Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 232–33 (2012), would be swapped out for difficult 
factual inquiries. It is not clear why replacing difficult questions of law with difficult questions of 
fact would be an improvement. 
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probably unnecessary. Rather, it seems likely that small changes could 
be made to how each element of the current test is analyzed, such that 
we could discipline courts’ analyses and offer better protection to 
speech without overly hampering government interests. Moreover, 
making small incremental changes to existing doctrine is simply more 
feasible in a common law system. 
To begin with the first element—that the government must offer a 
“substantial” or “significant” interest to justify a TMP restriction142—
the government should have to offer specific interests that are 
threatened by the speech and conduct that is likely to occur, 
particularly when it claims security is at stake. Despite offering 
disclaimers to the effect that “[t]he term ‘security’ cannot simply be 
brandished as a talisman to justify all burdens on speech,”143 this is 
exactly how some courts have behaved. The Tenth Circuit, for 
example, upheld a blanket ban on protest within a large “secured 
zone” outside a NATO conference,144 when there were no specifically 
identifiable threats, because “[i]t goes without saying . . . that security 
protocols exist to deal with hypothetical risks.”145 The First Circuit 
acted similarly in upholding a security plan that placed protesters 
behind two rows of fencing, liquid dispersal mesh, and overhead 
netting, even though “there [was] no evidence in the record” that 
someone might attempt to break through the fence, or throw items or 
liquids at convention delegates.146 In general, courts should bear in 
mind that what has happened at past events is clearly relevant, but the 
mere fact that something has occurred previously at some other 
protest does not mean it will happen at every similar future event. 
Whereas the WTO riots resulted in 300 arrests over approximately 
two days,147 there were only around twenty-five arrests total at the 
2012 DNC in Charlotte,148 and even fewer at the 2012 Republican 
National Convention (RNC) in Tampa.149 Not every scenario is the 
 
 142.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 796 (1989). 
 143.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1175 (D. Colo. 2008).  
 144.  See, e.g., Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1223–
26 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 145.  Id. at 1223. 
 146.  Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Boston, 378 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 147.  Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 148.  See Jessica Sells, Police: 24 People Arrested During the DNC, WBTV (Oct. 7, 2012, 
4:31 PM), http://www.wbtv.com/story/19486640/cmpd-releases-dnc-after-action-report. 
 149.  Colin Moynihan, For the Police and Protesters, a Quieter Convention, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/us/politics/for-police-and-protesters-a-
quieter-convention.html.  
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worst-case scenario; probabilities matter. If we ignore this, the specter 
of the Seattle WTO riots,150 and even the terror attacks of September 
11th, will swallow the First Amendment based on “mere speculation 
that violence may occur.”151 
Addressing the second element—the requirement that TMP 
restrictions be narrowly tailored152—is somewhat more difficult. To be 
sure, requiring a higher degree of specificity for the first element will 
go a long way toward improving these analyses, by virtue of the fact 
that narrow-tailoring is about shaping regulations so that they serve 
the government’s interests without reaching further than necessary. 
Narrow-tailoring is about precision and reticence: If the concern is 
about guns and explosives, employ magnetometers and bomb-sniffing 
dogs; if it is about protesters making Molotov cocktails, ban outside 
bottles and hand out bottled water at the site of the event;153 and if it 
is about sheer numbers of people, use a content-neutral permitting 
scheme that limits the numbers of individuals. There are almost 
always better options than banning protesters across the board, or 
restricting them to cages resembling “internment camp[s].”154 As a 
general rule, “the more extensive the restrictions, the more precise the 
justifications for that restriction must be.”155 
However, getting the first element right cannot solve every 
narrow-tailoring problem. Unless we are willing to employ something 
like a “least restrictive means test”—which the Supreme Court has 
definitively rejected,156 and which would make intermediate scrutiny 
TMP analyses nearly identical to the strict scrutiny employed for 
content-based distinctions157—highly intuitive judgments regarding 
government overreach will necessarily play a role. There is simply no 
 
 150.  See supra Part II.A. 
 151.  Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 9751 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
 152.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 153.  Such an approach might sound unrealistic, but it is not. Something very much like this 
happened in 2012 at the RNC in Tampa. See Moynihan, supra note 149 (“[The] police officers in 
Tampa [wore protective gear, but nonetheless] . . . appeared to cultivate a friendly relationship 
with protesters, often greeting them on sidewalks and . . . at one point dropping off water and 
fruit at an encampment of tents and tarps where protesters were sleeping.”). 
 154.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2004).  
 155.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1176 (D. Colo. 2008).  
 156.  See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1985) (“Regulations that burden 
speech incidentally or control the time, place, and manner of expression . . . . [are not invalid] 
simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on 
speech.”). 
 157.  R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1993). 
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way around this, and to require a wholly determinate jurisprudence 
asks too much. Judges will sometimes get it wrong, but judgment is 
required to adapt to changing and unforeseen circumstances. 
That being said, we should ask the government to explain, and 
judges to evaluate, why alternative measures could not suffice to 
protect government interests. Instead of openly deferring to 
government actors (including law enforcement) on this point,158 courts 
should require proof, and should not uphold speech restrictions when 
it would be feasible to employ more limited options (including 
ordinary law enforcement methods) that are likely to work nearly as 
well. Though, again, this will involve judicial discretion as to when 
government restrictions “go too far,” deliberately keeping this burden 
of proof on the government would help to ensure that core political 
speech is not swept up with proscribable violence. 
Making the third element—that government regulations “leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information”159—more speech protective could probably be achieved 
with one moderate change. Namely, courts should hold that “[a]n 
alternative channel is not sufficient if the speakers are not permitted 
to reach their intended audience.”160 This makes intuitive sense. If a 
protester is denied the ability to get her message across to those who 
disagree, or to someone with the political clout to act on her concerns 
(and in time for it to make some difference), she is left preaching to 
the choir, or hoping that her message “trickles up” to political actors 
through whatever channels are available. Debate requires 
interlocutors, and political change is exceedingly unlikely in the 
absence of felt dissent. This is why, as the Ninth Circuit later opined in 
Menotti, “[p]ublic protests are at the heart of the First Amendment 
and are critical for incubating civic engagement and encouraging 
spirited debate.”161 
 
 
 158.  See, e.g., United for Peace and Justice v. City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The Court will not second guess or substitute its judgment for that of the 
NYPD.”). 
 159.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 160.  Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 968, 978 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000). The Supreme Court has also suggested that such a right may be contained within the 
First Amendment. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655 
(1981) (“The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to reach the minds of willing 
listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 161.  Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1174 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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In order to determine whether an alternative channel for 
communication is adequate in the context of large political events, 
courts could utilize the “sight and sound” standard offered by 
plaintiffs in cases like Coalition to March on the RNC162 and ACLU.163 
In ACLU, the court criticized this standard as too vague to be 
useful.164 Interestingly, however, the court also pointed to the solution 
when it opined that “[w]hat restrictions will permit communication 
depend upon the particular circumstances in which they are 
imposed.”165 That is, this analysis will have to be contextual, and will 
have to focus on the message that the speakers actually seek to 
convey, in addition to the audience to whom they seek to convey it.166 
Generally speaking, marches can get their point across from a further 
distance than can individuals with picket signs, and sound 
amplification may be logistically necessary in a large rally, but not in a 
public park. Accordingly, applying this standard would be fact-
intensive—but no more so than existing doctrine. 
To be clear, the changes in doctrine and application proposed here 
cannot fix every problem. They cannot solve problems of having many 
speakers and too few spaces to accommodate them all. Though this is 
clearly a First Amendment concern, there will be times when 
demands for space and resources outstrip supply, and there is little 
that one can do about the fact that two individuals cannot occupy the 
same space at the same time. These changes also provide no answer to 
the question of how much deference a court should give to a speaker 
 
 162.  Coal. to March on the RNC and Stop the War v. City of St. Paul, 557 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 
1016–17 (D. Minn. 2008).   
 163.  ACLU of Colo. v. City of Denver, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149, 1181 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 164.  More specifically, the court asked a series of rhetorical questions to probe whether 
there could be such a standard:  
Although the following questions might seem rhetorical, if the term “within sight and 
sound” is a legal standard, they must be answered in order to formulate a definition. 
From whose vantage point is “sight” or “sound” measured—the speaker or the 
audience? . . . Is a speaker within “sight” if she is merely within the range of normal 
visual perception (potentially thousands of feet under certain conditions)? Or does 
“being within sight” limit the range to that in which a speaker can be identified as a 
person, or where attributes of that person can be distinguished, or when a sign with 
text of a particular size held by the speaker can be read by the viewer? Is the speaker 
within “sound” of her audience if the audience can perceive that someone is speaking, 
or must the audience be able to discern the content of the message? Does the effect of 
cacophony or background noise change the calculation? Does amplification matter, or 
is it required? 
Id. The court concluded: “[D]espite its catchy and cogent format, the phrase “sight and sound” 
does little more than restate the obvious—expressive speech is designed to communicate.” Id. 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  For a proposal along these lines, see Knicely & Whitehead, supra note 87, at 484–87. 
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regarding the content of her message, and to whom she wishes to 
communicate. There will be times when courts have to say “just 
because the plaintiffs say so, does not make it so.”167 But the few 
changes proposed do not require radical departures from existing 
doctrine, and they will help to avoid situations in which dissent is 
literally caged. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that the “law of large 
political conventions”168 has turned the First Amendment on its 
head169: Core political speech, long viewed as living at the heart of the 
First Amendment, has been heavily and repeatedly restricted as a 
means of guarding against violent conduct, often based on weak or 
nonexistent evidence of actual danger. And federal courts, at both the 
district and appellate levels, have warped First Amendment doctrine 
to offer their blessings to such impediments. Justice Robert Jackson 
long ago noted the dangerous tendency to “reduce our liberties to a 
shadow, often in answer to exaggerated claims of security.”170 That 
concern remains as real now as it was then. And unless courts are 
prepared to do more than pay lip service, and are willing to apply 
proper scrutiny to regulations that limit core political speech, we risk 
the slow erosion of the very political rights that ensure that our form 
of government is, and remains, democratic. 
 
 
 167.  See Nat’l Council of Arab Ams. v. City of New York, 331 F. Supp. 2d 258, 271 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Simply because Plaintiffs feel that no other location in New York City is 
worthy of their cause . . . does not make it so.”). 
 168.  Coal. to Protest the DNC, 327 F. Supp. 2d 61, 73 (D. Mass. 2004) (referring to the law it 
applied as “The Law of Demonstration Zones”). 
 169.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (“The argument, in 
essence, is that protected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech. This 
analysis turns the First Amendment upside down.”). 
 170.  Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 116 
(1951). 
